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Abstract
Sensory attenuation refers to the observation that self-generated stimuli are attenuated, both in terms of their
phenomenology and their cortical response compared to the same stimuli when generated externally. Accordingly, it has
been assumed that sensory attenuation might help individuals to determine whether a sensory event was caused by
themselves or not. In the present study, we investigated whether this dependency is reciprocal, namely whether sensory
attenuation is modulated by prior beliefs of authorship. Participants had to judge the loudness of auditory effects that they
believed were either self-generated or triggered by another person. However, in reality, the sounds were always triggered
by the participants’ actions. Participants perceived the tones’ loudness attenuated when they believed that the sounds were
self-generated compared to when they believed that they were generated by another person. Sensory attenuation is
considered to contribute to the emergence of people’s belief of authorship. Our results suggest that sensory attenuation is
also a consequence of prior belief about the causal link between an action and a sensory change in the environment.
Citation: Desantis A, Weiss C, Schu ¨tz-Bosbach S, Waszak F (2012) Believing and Perceiving: Authorship Belief Modulates Sensory Attenuation. PLoS ONE 7(5):
e37959. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037959
Editor: Manos Tsakiris, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom
Received January 11, 2012; Accepted May 1, 2012; Published May 29, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Desantis et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The research leading to these results received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement nu263067. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: aerdna.desantis@gmail.com
Introduction
Many movements result in sensory consequences similar to
sensory input elicited by external events. However, several studies
observed that self- and externally generated sensory signals are
processed differently. Notably, self-generated stimuli are attenuat-
ed both in terms of their phenomenology [1–3] and their cortical
response [4,5] compared to the same stimuli externally generated.
It has often been assumed that sensory attenuation emerges from
internal forward models that predict the sensory consequences of
an ongoing action [3,6–8]. In line with this idea, several studies
show that sensory attenuation varies as a function the predictabil-
ity of the perceptual action consequences [3,6,9] and that it is
genuinely a result of motor prediction and not of prediction in
general [1].
The phenomenon of sensory attenuation has been considered to
enhance the ability to differentiate externally triggered sensory
changes from self-produced action effects [10]. Moreover,
attenuation is also thought to be an important perceptual cue
contributing to the emergence of our belief of authorship, i.e., the
belief of being the cause of a sensory change in the environment
[2,11]. The link between sensory attenuation and beliefs of
authorship has been emphasized in the study of schizophrenia
patients showing symptoms such as delusions of control and
thought insertion. Specifically, several studies show that these
patients fail to attenuate responses to the sensory consequences of
their actions and speech [12–15], thus leading to difficulties in
distinguishing internally from externally generated stimuli [15,16].
However, the relationship between sensory attenuation and
belief of authorship must not necessarily be a one-way road from
sensory attenuation to belief of authorship. It is also possible that
authorship beliefs modulate sensory attenuation. Note that the
contrasts that have usually been used to assess sensory attenuation
compared conditions in which sensory events were either
externally triggered or produced by a voluntary action. These
conditions differ in motor predictive processes and the causal link
between action and effect (prior belief of authorship) at the same
time [17]. The present study, using self-produced stimuli in all
conditions, investigates whether belief of authorship alone results
in sensory attenuation, i.e., whether authorship belief is a driving
force behind sensory attenuation instead of merely being inferred
from perceived attenuation.
An influence of the belief of authorship on perception has
recently been observed in experiments on intentional binding [18–
20], i.e., the finding that when a voluntary action produces a
sensory event, action and outcome are perceived as closer together
in time [21]. This phenomenon has been interpreted to be based
on the same predictive motor mechanisms discussed above
[22,23]. However, two recent studies [24,25] suggest that sensory
attenuation and intentional binding are not based on the same
mechanisms. Thus, it is still unknown whether prior authorship
beliefs influence sensory attenuation in the same way.
To shed further light on this issue we assessed the perceived
loudness of auditory stimuli [2,9,26,27] in a social setting that
allowed for the manipulation of participants’ prior belief of
authorship. Specifically, participants were led to believe that a
sound was either triggered by themselves or by someone else,
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themselves. To foreshadow the results, we found the perceived
loudness of the sound to be attenuated when participants believed
that the sound was triggered by their own action, compared to
when they believed that it was triggered by another agent. We will
discuss the implications of the finding in the discussion.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twelve subjects (average age 22.7 years, SD=3.5 years)
participated in the experiment for an allowance of J 10/h. All
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and were
naı ¨ve as to the hypothesis under investigation. They all gave
written informed consent. The study was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the local
Ethics Committee.
Material
Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were conducted
using the psychophysics Toolbox [28,29] for Matlab 7.5.0 running
on a PC computer connected to two 19-in. 85 Hz CRT monitors.
Auditory stimuli were presented via a pair of headphones.
Stimuli and procedure
Participants were informed that the experimenter takes part in
the experiment as a second participant, as the real second
participant has canceled. The experiment consisted of two phases:
A belief implementation phase and a test phase. In both phases we
used two monitors (one in front of the participant, and the other in
front of the experimenter) and one keyboard connected to the
same PC.
Belief implementation phase. Participants carried out two
conditions in separate blocks of 100 trials each. Block order was
counterbalanced across participants. In the self condition the
participant’s name was displayed on the center of both screens.
Participants were required to execute right index finger key presses
at a self-paced rate. In the other condition the experimenter’s name
was displayed on the screens. The participant observed the
experimenter executing self-paced key-presses. Both the partici-
pants’ and the experimenter’s key press actions were followed by a
1000 Hz tone after an interval (stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA)
of 150, 300 or 450 ms. The tone was presented for 100 ms with a
pressure level of 74 dB. The probability that the tone occurred
after one of the three intervals was set to .7 for the 300 ms SOA
.15 for the 150 ms SOA and .15 for the 450 ms. At the beginning
of each block the participant was shown that only the key press of
the person whose name was displayed on the screens could trigger
the tone. The aim of this phase was to make the participant adopt
two contextual beliefs: 1) if my name is displayed, the tone follows
my action; 2) if the experimenter’s name is displayed, the tone
follows his action.
Thereafter, participants ran another belief implementation
block that was more similar to the test phase. Here, a clock-face
and a clock-hand (rotating with a period of 3 sec.) were displayed
on the two screens. The clock-face included a shaded area. The
size of the shaded area was 60u of the clock-face; its location was
randomly chosen. The participants were shown that only the
person whose name was displayed on the screens could trigger the
tone by executing a key press while the clock-hand passed through
the shaded area (no tone was delivered if that person executed a
key press outside the shaded area). The participant’s or
experimenter’s name was displayed either below or above the
clock-face (counterbalanced across participants). Participant ran
10 trials per condition (self and other). The second belief
implementation phase was meant to familiarize participants with
the task procedure of the test phase.
Test phase. The participant and experimenter were separat-
ed by a card board. Both saw the same clock-face, clock-hand and
a randomly located shaded area on the screen (see above).
Participants ran two conditions: a self and an other condition. In
these conditions either the participant’s (self condition) or the
experimenter’s name (other condition) was displayed on the screens,
in order to make the participants believe that, in the given trial, the
tone would either be triggered by their own or the experimenter’s
action. In both conditions, the participant and the experimenter
had to execute a key press when the clock-hand passed through the
shaded area for the first time. Participants wore sound isolating
headphones preventing them to hear and being distracted by the
experimenter’s key-presses. Furthermore, the experimenter was
instructed to avoid any noisy key-presses. Importantly, contrary to
the belief implementation phase, the tone was always (expect in
some rare case, see below) triggered by the participant’s key press
regardless of the name displayed on the screens. The tone
appeared after one of three SOAs (150, 300 or 450 ms) with the
same probability we used in the belief implementation phase. We
used three SOAs to introduce variability between the participants’
action and the occurrence of the sound. This was meant to prevent
the participants from realizing that they triggered the tone in both
belief conditions. We chose these three interval probabilities to
calibrate internal forward model to predict in particular the tone at
300 ms SOA. Data analysis focused on the 300 ms SOA. The
other SOAs were just used to induce the beliefs. Moreover, in
order to strengthen the participants’ authorship beliefs, the
experimenter deactivated the participants’ key twice in the other
condition and triggered the tone himself (mostly during the second
rotation of the hand).
To assess the influence of prior belief on participants loudness
perception we used a comparison task procedure that have been
previously used to show sensory attenuation of self-generated
sensory event [2,26,27]. At the end of each trial (see Figure 1)
participants and experimenter were required to compare the
loudness of the standard tone (1000 Hz, 100 ms, 74 dB) generated
by the key press with a comparison tone of the same frequency and
duration but varying in magnitude. The comparison tone was
presented after a random interval of 800–1200 ms. Its sound
pressure level varied randomly between 71 and 77 dB in 1 dB
steps. The participants judged which of the two tones (the standard
tone or comparison tone) was louder by pressing with their left
hand one of two keys. At the end of the experiment participants
had to answer yes or no to the following questions: 1) ‘‘Did you
believe that whenever your name was displayed on the screens you
and not the other participant triggered the first tone?’’; 2) ‘‘Did
you believe that whenever the other participant’s name was
displayed on the screens s/he and not you triggered the first
tone?’’.
The test phase consisted of 200 trials per belief condition (140
trials with 300 ms SOA, and 30 trials for each of the two other
SOAs). For the 300 ms SOAs of both belief conditions each of the
seven comparison tone magnitudes was presented 20 times. Each
belief condition was presented in 10 mini-blocks of 20 trials. Mini-
blocks were presented alternately with block presentation being
counterbalanced across subjects.
Results
As mentioned above data of the 150 and 450 ms SOA were
excluded from analysis. The proportion of ‘‘second tone louder’’
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participant, condition and the seven magnitudes of the comparison
tone. Psychometric functions were fitted using the Psignifit
Toolbox version 2.5.6 for Matlab (see http://bootstrap-software.
org/psignifit/) which implements the maximum-likelihood meth-
od described by Wichmann and Hill [30]. Based on each
individual function, we calculated the point of subjective equality
(PSE) and the just noticeable difference (JND). The PSE, defined
as the comparison tone magnitude judged as louder than the first
tone on 50% of trials, reflects the perceived loudness intensity of
the first tone under the two belief conditions [2,26]. For instance, if
sensory attenuation is stronger in the self condition, one would
expect a significantly lower PSE value in this condition compared
to the other condition. The JND, defined as the difference of the
comparison tone magnitude judged as louder on 75% and judged
as louder on 25% of trials divided by 2, assesses the precision of
responses as it reflects the variability of loudness perception. For
example, if the self belief manipulation would lead to a general
impairment in the amount of available perceptual information
(e.g., due to a reduction of attention in this condition) and
therefore to an increase of response variability, one would expect a
higher JND value in the self condition compared to the other
condition. The level of significance of our analysis was set at p,.05
for all statistical tests.
All the participants believed i) that they triggered the sound
when their name was displayed on the screen and ii) that the
experimenter triggered the sound when his name was displayed.
Hence, although in reality the tone was always triggered by the
participants’ action, they adopted different authorship beliefs in
the two conditions.
PSE values of the self and other condition were compared using a
paired one-tailed t-test. The analysis revealed that PSE values were
significantly lower in the self condition compared to the other
condition t(11)=2.73, p=.010 (Figure 2), indicating a reduction
on the perceived intensity of the stimulus in the former compared
to the latter.
A paired two-tailed t-test on JND values showed no significant
difference between the two conditions t(11)=0.07, p=.943. This
indicates that response variability did not differ in the two belief
conditions, suggesting that the effect of attenuation we observed in
the self condition compared the other condition was specifically
related to a reduced intensity perception of the standard tone
(PSE) but not to a general reduction in the amount of available
perceptual information (JND).
Discussion
Self-generated auditory stimuli have largely been observed to be
attenuated compared to those externally generated [2,9,26,27,31–
Figure 1. Schematic representation of an experimental trial. At the beginning of each trial of both belief conditions the participant’s name
(self condition) or experimenter’s name (other condition) blinked for 800 ms. Then, the name stopped to blink and the clock-hand started to rotate.
Participant and experimenter had to execute a key-press when the clock-hand first passed through the shaded area. The participant always triggered
the sound in both belief conditions after one of three possible SOAs (150, 300 or 450 ms). After a random interval (between 800–1200 ms) from the
occurrence of the first tone a second tone occurred. Finally, 500 ms after the occurrence of the second tone the clock-hand stopped and both
participant and experimenter answered the question: ‘‘Which one of the two tones was louder?’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037959.g001
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differs in both motor predictive processes and authorship belief.
Therefore, in the present study we contrasted self-produced stimuli
in two conditions differing only in the participants’ authorship
belief. Both belief conditions were identical in terms of sensori-
motor-based temporal predictability, since, unbeknownst to the
participant, it was always the participant who triggered the tone.
First of all, note that the fact that our manipulation worked (i.e.,
we successfully induced different belief of authorship), confirms
that authorship is not directly perceived but inferred from different
cues as prior knowledge and other context-related factors [34–36].
More importantly, we found a reduction of the PSE value when
participants believed that their own action triggered the tone
compared to when they believed that the other participant’s action
triggered the tone. Our results, thus, show that differences in
authorship belief are sufficient to yield sensory attenuation.
One possible explanation for this result is that participants
allocate attentional resources differently in the two conditions.
Previous studies have shown that allocating more/less attention to
stimuli alters their perceived intensity [37,38]. However, this
explanation seems unlikely to us for two reasons. Firstly, in both
conditions participants’ attention was likewise oriented to the clock
hand. Secondly, Anton-Erxleben et al., [37] (see experiment 3 & 4)
showed that in comparison tasks a difference in allocation of
attention does not only modulate the perceived intensity of the
stimulus (PSE) but also the response variability (reflected by the
JND in the present experiment). However, in our experiment the
discrimination performance (JND) was identical in the two belief
conditions. Thus, it is unlikely that the difference in intensity
attenuation (PSE) we observed is due general change in attentional
attunement.
The present study demonstrates that differences in authorship
belief alone can result in sensory attenuation. However, note that
this does not mean to say that internal forward models do not play
any role in the emergence of sensory attenuation. In the contrary,
we believe that our results can be accounted for in terms of
predictive motor processing. Several scenarios are possible. In the
most radical one, prior authorship belief determines whether or
not the action’s consequence is (motor) predicted in the first place.
If the sensorimotor system believes that somebody else triggers the
upcoming stimulus why should it predict the event? One could
argue that, in this case, the system actually makes an invalid
prediction, as the prediction might erroneously result in self-
attribution of the given stimulation.
A less radical explanation would be that authorship belief
influences how reliable the brain considers internal forward
models to be. Specifically, depending on whether or not the agent
believes to be the cause of an upcoming event, predictive motor
signals might get high and low weights, respectively, in a process
integrating different cues concerning the self/other distinction of
the upcoming stimulus [39–41].
One might argue that the effect we observed was partly due to
the fact that participants were not completely free to time their
actions, since they had to act within the shaded area. Self-initiated
action yield stronger activation of action control structures (e.g.,
the SMA complex) compared to action that are externally
triggered [42]. Although several studies observed sensory attenu-
ation in conditions in which participants responded to a go signal
[4,6,43] (suggesting that internal prediction is still available to the
subject), it is possible that weak internal predictive signals (due to
the fact that participants were not completely free to time their
action) might have made people more susceptible to the influence
of external cues such as the prior belief of authorship [39,44].
Further research is necessary to clarify this issue.
Our findings might also provide important information for the
understanding of delusions of control in schizophrenia. Our results
suggest that abnormal prior beliefs of authorship may contribute to
the emergence of abnormal perceptions. This is in agreement with
recent Bayesian integrative accounts of agency which suggest that
people’s perception of sensory action consequences and their
experience of being in control of their actions is based on the
combination of prior knowledge and the likelihood obtained from
sensory input [13,39]. Our results might indicate that a globally
altered belief of oneself as an agent may lead to an inadequate
weighting of different authorship indicators, and may, thus, result
in the emergence of abnormal perceptions/beliefs in a specific
situation. For instance, abnormal beliefs may result in assigning a
particular salience to stimuli that in reality have to be attenuated
because they are self-generated. These stimuli might feel strange
and externally generated [13,39].
Sensory attenuation has usually been assessed comparing self-vs.
externally generated stimuli. Three recent studies, for example,
observed attenuation of self- vs. externally generated auditory
stimuli using exactly the same stimuli and procedure as the present
study [2,26,27]. As mentioned above, this contrast covers, amongst
others, motor prediction and authorship belief. The main interest
of the present study was to isolate the effect of authorship belief.
To do so, we did not necessarily need to include a condition in
which stimuli are externally generated. Since the manipulation of
authorship belief was rather challenging, we decided to renounce
on this type of condition. However, future research could compare
the strength of authorship-induced sensory attenuation with the
strength of sensory attenuation based on the contrast of external
vs. self-produced stimuli to further clarify the different factors
contributing to the phenomenon of sensory attenuation.
Finally, we would like to point out one caveat. We (and all other
studies using a similar methodology) cannot tell for sure whether
our manipulation affected participants’ sensitivity or whether it
induced a response bias. This is because the PSE may be affected
by both response criterion and sensitivity. However, using signal
detection theory methodology [45], Cardoso-Leite et al. [1]
recently showed that sensory attenuation (at least in the visual
domain) is based on decreased sensitivity and not on a shift in
Figure 2. Proportion of ‘‘second tone louder’’ responses for the
300 ms SOA for the self and other condition (averaged across
all participants) as a function of the seven comparison tone
magnitudes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037959.g002
Authorship Belief and Sensory Attenuation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e37959response bias. We therefore feel confident that this also holds for
our experiment.
In conclusion, sensory attenuation is usually considered to
contribute to the emergence of people’s belief of authorship. Our
experiment indicates that the relationship between perception and
belief is reciprocal, i.e., that sensory attenuation is also shaped by
prior authorship belief.
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